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New Brunswick’s Residential Tenancies Act1: The 
Constitution and the Rentalsman
New Brunswick’s Residential Tenancies Act was released from its seven 
year limbo and proclaimed in force as of 1 January 1983, notwithstanding 
doubts having been raised as to its Constitutional validity. These doubts 
have been focused not at the general subject matter o f  the legislation, for 
there is no question of provincial competence with respect to landlord and 
tenant relations,2 but to the chosen mechanism for enforcing or applying 
the law — the office of the rentalsman. T he basis for the alleged invalidity 
is a purported contravention of a seemingly innocuous provision of the 
Constitution Act, 1 8 6 7* respecting the appointment of judges. The purpose 
of this comment is to assess the constitutionality of the Residential Tenancies 
A ct, or more particularly the office of the rentalsman, in light of the doubts 
expressed.
Section 96
The written constitution of a federal state such as Canada must be 
framed in terms of two fundamental types of provisions — institutional 
and distribution of powers. It should be self evident that the constitutional 
instrument must create not only the structures of the state, in terms of 
legislatures, courts and juristic units, but also set the parameters of inter­
relationship between the structures created and between the structures and 
individual citizens. Such institutional provisions are to be contrasted with 
the subject matter distribution of legislative powers between the federal 
and provincial juristic units. That institutional provisions are superior to 
and control distribution of legislative power provisions was early recognized 
by Ritchie C.J. in Valin v. Langlois, a case concerning the validity of federal 
conferral of controverted elections jurisdiction upon provincial Superior 
Courts, in the following terms:
. . . before these specific powers o f legislation were conferred on Parliament and 
on the Local Legislatures, all matters connected with the constitution o f Parlia­
ment and the Provincial Constitutions had been duly provided for, separate and 
distinct from the distribution o f  legislative powers, and, o f  course, over-riding 
the powers so distributed; for, until Parliament and the Local Legislatures were 
duly constituted, no legislative powers, if conferred, could be exerc ised.1
*Constitutional Act, IS 6 7 , 30-31 Viet., c.3, s.92(13) ( I  K.). 
'Ib id .. s.96.
•S.N.B. 1975, c .R -10.2.
4( 1879), 3 S.C.R 1. 11;  affirmed, (1879). 5 A.C. 115 (P C.).
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A century later this seemingly obvious dichotomy of constitutional 
provisions has only recently been confirmed by the Supreme Court. In 
Alberta N atural Gas Reference' he Court was faced with the countervailing 
claims of federal legislative jurisdiction to impose a natural gas export tax 
pursuant to the broad federal taxation power6, and provincial immunity 
from federal taxation mandated by section 125.7 In direct conflict were a 
distribution of powers provision protected by a non obstante clause and an 
institutional provision governing the relationship between the federal and 
provincial juristic units. Which was to prevail? The multi-authored majority 
judgment includes the following decisive conclusion:8 “The legislative pow­
ers conferred by Part VI (subsection 91 to 95) must be regarded as qualified 
by provisions elsewhere in the Act. Otherwise those other provisions are 
meaningless.” This is a clear recognition and assertion by the Court that 
the distribution of powers provisions in the Constitution Acts are subject to 
and controlled by the institutional provisions.
One such institutional or “other provision” is section 96: “The Gov­
ernor General shall appoint the Judges of the Superior, District, and County 
Courts in each Province except those of the Courts of Probate in Nova 
Scotia and New Brunswick.” This bare appointing power has been judicially 
construed as imposing an effective separation of powers controlling prov­
incial legislative jurisdiction respecting administration o f justice9 and pow­
ers of appointm ent.10 It was early recognized that to strictly limit the scope 
of the section to mere nomenclature would allow provincial subversion of 
this constitutional restraint by the bare transfer of jurisdiction and powers 
from the named Courts to other tribunals or agencies.11 Accordingly, a 
gloss has been judicially added to the bare words of the section so that its 
intendment is not one of mere nomenclature but of the exercise of such 
jurisdiction and powers reposed in the enum erated Courts. Therefore a 
cutoff point has been artificially imposed on the hierarchy of Courts — 
superior and inferior — such that a judge or any body exercising jurisdic­
tion or powers such as to be constituted in law a section 96 Court must be 
federally appointed. All other judges or functionaries exercising jurisdic­
tion or powers below the threshold established by section 96 may be prov- 
incially appointed.
h( 1982), 42 N.R. 361, (S.C.C.). See also: In  R e The Initiative and Referendum  Act, [ 1919] A.C. 935 (P.C.); Re: 
Authority o f Parliament in Relation to the Upper House, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 54, 30 N.R. 271.
6s.91 . . .  it is hereby declared  that (notw ithstanding  anything in this Act) the exclusive Legislative A uthority 
of the Parliam ent o f  C anada extends to all M atters com ing within the Classes o f  Subjects next herein-after 
enum era ted ; that is to say, — 3. T h e  Raising o f  Money by any M ode o r System o f Taxation .
7No Lands o r P roperty  belonging to C anada o r  any Province shall be- liable to  Taxation.
*Supra, footnote 5, at 387.
C onstitu tion  Act, ¡ 8 6 7 , s.92(14): T h e  A dm inistration  o f  justice in the Province . . .
>0lb id ., s.92(4): T h e  Establishm ent and  T e n u re  of Provincial Office* and the A ppointm ent and  Payment 
o f Provincial Officers.
' ‘e.g.. Reference R e Adoption Act, [ 1938] S.C.R. 398, 414 (per D uff C.J.C.).
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Before turning to an examination of the threshold test for section 96. 
two matters may be briefly canvassed. First, it has often been stated, both 
by academic writers12 and by some jurists,15 that section 96 does not bind 
Parliament. Expressed in absolute terms, this general proposition, it is 
submitted, is in error. Rejection does not, however, connote acceptance of 
Lederm an’s thesis that there exists an extrenched status and core jurisdic­
tion binding Parliament with respect to federal superior courts and curial 
agencies.14 There is a middle ground.
A reading of section 96 reveals its neutrality as an appointing power 
with respect to functionaries exercising powers or jurisdiction above a 
threshold level. If one exercises such powers or jurisdiction, one must be 
federally appointed. In one sense, therefore, it is accurate to state that since 
all federal functionaries are federally appointed, section 96 could not be 
violated by Parliament and accordingly Parliament is not bound thereby. 
But what of Parliament conferring section 96 powers or jurisdiction upon 
a provincial appointee? Is it not self-evident that, for example, a provincial 
court judge exercising a superior Court jurisdiction conferred by a reor­
ganization of the Criminal Code by Parliament would violate section 96? 
Objectively viewed, a provincial appointee would be exercising section 96 
powers or jurisdiction in violation thereof. It is in this respect, it is sub­
mitted, that the controls inherent in the institutional provision, section 96, 
bind Parliament. It is to be noted that Valin v. Langlois,13 the authority 
frequently cited for the proposition that “Parliament may repose jurisdic­
tion, in respect of any matter within its competence in provincially ap­
pointed officers,”16 was concerned solely with the competency of Parliament 
to confer controverted elections jurisdiction (a matter previously dealt with 
by Parliament itself) upon provincial superior courts, an issue which did 
not raise the restraint of section 96 and was therefore not considered by 
the Supreme Court or Privy Council.
Second, it is important to note the constitutional value of section 96. 
Characterized as “a cardinal provision oi the statute”17 and one of the “three
läe.g., J . Willis, "A dm inistrative Law and the British N orth  America Act,” (1939), 53 H arvard  L.R. 251, 
263-64; B. Laskin, “M unicipal T ax  Assessment and  Section 96 o f the British N orth  America Act: T h e  
O lym pia Bowling Alleys C ase”, (1955K33 C.B.R. 993 ,994 ; P.W. Hogg, Constitutional Lau< o f Canada (T oron to : 
Carswell Co., 1977), 127.
xiR . v. M cD onald, [1958] O .R . 373, 382 (C.A.) (Iaid law  J.A .) R. v. Canada Labour Relations Board, ex parte 
Federal Electric Corp. (1964), 44 D.L.R. (2d) 440, 462-63 (Man. Q.B.) (Smith J.); Popp  v. Ptipp (1970] 1 O.R. 
331, 339 (O nt. C.A.) (Laskin J .A.); Zacks v. Zacks, [1973] S.C.R. 891, 908 (M artland ).); Jones v. Attorney 
G eneral o f Canada (1974), 45 D.L.R. (3d) 583, 590 (S.C.C.) (la sk in  C.J.C.); Ref. Re Family Relations Act o f 
B.C. (1982), 40 N.R. 206, 239 (S.C.C.) ( la sk in  C.J.C.). All o f  these statem ents may expunged  w ithout 
affecting  the final result in any o f  the cases.
MW.R. L ederm an. "T h e  Independence  o f the Jud iciarv”, (1956), 34 C.B.R 769.
>bSupra, footnote at 4.
,6Papp  v. P app , supra, foo tno te  13 at 339.
n M artineau &  Sons L td. v. M ontreal, [1932] A.C. 113. 120 (P.C.) (Lord Blancsburgh).
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principle pillars in the temple of justice and . . . not to be underm ined”,18 
it has been consistently accepted as a cornerstone in securing the “impar­
tiality and independence of the Provincial judiciary”.19 It was apparently 
felt that federally appointed, paid and tenured judges would have the 
independence necessary to impartially apply both federal and provincial 
law since they would not be solely dependent on either body for their 
jurisdiction or remuneration. Being federal appointees, with not only orig­
inal but also supervisory jurisdiction over the inferior provincially ap­
pointed tribunals, it was f urther felt that a unifying influence would pervade 
the disparate provinces. From a mature constitutional perspective, one may 
argr that the constitutional value of section 96 lies in the creation of a 
fos ,n for the adjudication of constitutional issues which is not wholly 
de pendent on one or other partner in the federation. It is to be noted that 
it is from this perspective that critical calls for the reform of the Supreme 
Court of Canada have been based.
The threshold test for a violation of section 96 has been an evolving 
one. In Toronto Corp. v. York Corp.,20 the Privy Council upheld a challenge 
to the validity of the Ontario Municipal Board, as then constituted, on the 
basis that, as a provincially appointed administrative body, it was not com­
petent to exercise judicial powers analogous to those of a section 96 court.
The emphasis placed on the detached power in Toronto Corp. was ef­
fectively repudiated by the Privy Council in Labour Relations Board o f Sas­
katchewan x.John East Iron Works Ltd.21 I'here, the authority of the provincially 
appointed Board to issue a re-instatement order was challenged as an 
invalid exercise of judicial powers by an administrative body. The Privy 
Council, per Lord Simonds, agreed on the essentially administrative nature 
of the Board but dismissed the challenge after examining the institutional 
framework within which the power was exercised. The test propounded 
by Lord Simonds reversed the touchstone expressed earlier by Duff C.J. 
in Reference Re Adoption Act22 such that the question was to be whether the 
jurisdiction “broadly conform[ed] to the type of jurisdiction exercised by 
superior, district or county courts.”23 Construing the scheme in issue, Lord 
Simonds placed particular emphasis on the absence of a lis inter partes in 
the traditional sense and the non-legal training of Board members in de­
termining that the threshold test was not violated. It should be noted that, 
in focusing on its institutional setting, the Privy Council did not find it
18Toronto Corp. v. York Corp., [1938] A.C. 415, 426 (P.C.) (Lord Atkin).
l*Supra, footnote 17; R e Family Relation.s -4r/ of British Columbia (1982), 40 N.R. 206, 209-210 (S.C.C.) (Eslev
J>-
20Supra , footnote 18.
*'[ 1949] A.C. 134 (P C.).
24[ 1938] S.C.R. 398.
Supra, footnote 21, at 154.
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necessary to answer the initial question as to whether or not the disputed 
power was, in a detached sense, a judicial one.
Approximately three decades later, in Tomko v. Labour Relations Board 
of N ova Scotia,24 the Supreme Court was faced with a challenge to the power 
of a provincial board to issue cease and desist orders, contended to be 
equivalent to a superior court power to grant an injunction. Laskin C.J.C., 
delivering the majority opinion, stressed that “it is not the detached juris­
diction or power alone that is to be considered but rather its setting in the 
institutional arrangem ent in which it appears and is exercisable under the 
provincial legislation.”25 Referring to the test enunicated in John East, Laskin 
C.J.C. determ ined that the exercise by the Board of its cease and desist 
power differed fundamentally from the injunctive power of a superior 
court. Im portant considerations included (a) that the Board did not have 
power to enforce its orders “in contradistinction to the power of a Superior 
Court to entertain contempt proceedings”26; (b) that “[un]like a Court, the 
Board or Panel makes its own investigation of the issues raised by the 
complaint and decides for itself on its findings whether an interim order 
should issue”27; and (c) the policy considerations pertaining to the “fluidity 
and volatility of labour relations issues”28 which allow for efforts at settle­
ment before or after the making of a Board order.
The final link in the evolution of the current threshold test for a 
violation of section 96 was achieved in the 1981 Supreme Court decision 
in Re Residential Tenancies Act o f Ontario.™ Noting an earlier critical com­
ment of the British Columbia Court o f Appeal that “no general tests are 
offered or established in the Tomko judgm ent for the characterization of 
the function, the characterization of the institutional arrangements, and 
the examination of their relationship”30, Dickson J., in delivering the judg­
ment of the Court, proceeded to synthesize prior judicial authority in enun­
ciating the following three-step general test:31
The first involves consideration, in the light o f  the historical conditions 
existing in 1867, o f  the particular power or jurisdiction conferred upon the 
tribunal. T he question here is whether the power or jurisdiction conforms to 
the power or jurisdiction exercised by superior, district or county courts at the 
time o f  Confederation . . .
‘"(1977] 1 S.C.R. 122; (1975), 69 D.L.R. (3d) 250.
r>tbid.. S C R. 120; D.L.R. 255.
«’Ibid., S.C.R. 121; D.L.R. 256.
” lbtd., S.C.R. 122; D.L.R. 257.
™lbid.
w(1981), 37 N.R. 158 (S.C.C.).
50Prpita v. Doukas (1979), 16 B.C.L.R 120, 126; 101 D.L.R (3d) 577, 582 (B.C.C.A.) (U m b e r t  | A ).
51Supra , footnote  29, at 174-76.
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If the historical inquiry leads to the conclusion that the power or jurisdiction 
is not broadly conformable to jurisdiction formerly exercised by s.96 courts, that 
is the end o f the matter . . .  If, however, the historical evidence indicates that 
the impugned power is identical or analogous to a power exercised by section 
96 courts at Confederation, then one must proceed to the second step o f the 
inquiry.
Step two involves consideration of the function within its institutional setting 
to determine whether the function itself is different when viewed in that setting.
In particular, can the function still be considered to be a ‘judicial’ function . . .
[T]he question o f  whether any particular function is ‘judicial’ is not to be de­
termined simply on the basis o f  procedural trappings. The primary issue is the 
nature o f the question which the tribunal is called upon to decide. Where the 
tribunal is faced with a private dispute between parties, and is called upon to 
adjudicate through the application o f a recognized body o f rules in a manner 
consistent with fairness and impartiality, then, normally, it is acting in a ‘judicial 
capacity’ . . .
If, after examining the institutional context, it becomes apparent that the 
power is not being exercised as a judicial power, then the inquiry need go no 
further . . . On the other hand, if the power or jurisdiction is exercised in a 
judicial manner, then it becomes necessary to proceed to the third and final step 
in the analysis and review the tribunal’s function as a whole in order to appraise 
the impugned function in its entire institutional context . . . The scheme is only 
invalid when the adjudicative function is a sole or central function o f the tri­
bunal . . .  so that the tribunal can be said to be operating ‘like a section 96 court’.
Capsulated, the threshold test requires a historical inquiry into the 
detached power of jurisdiction, an examination of its particular exercise 
by the provincial appointee and finally an examination of its exercise within 
the institutional context. If at any step a negative response is concluded with 
respect to the question of analogy or conformability to a section 96 court, 
the power or jurisdiction has been validly conferred upon the provincial 
appointee. Reversing the perspective, an affirmative conclusion must be 
reached at each step for the power or jurisdiction to be held to be in validly 
conferred. The process involves a shift in focus from the particular to a 
general perspective. It should be obvious that the test can be short-circuited 
by proceeding directly to step two (or three) on the assumption that prior 
step(s) are affirmative, thereby obviating the necessity for the historical 
inquiry. On a more general level, it should also be obvious that in seeking 
to allow provincial flexibility in structuring provincial administration of 
justice, the Court has provided a mechanism by which section 96 courts 
can be ef f ectively denuded of all powers and jurisdiction through properly 
framed legislative schemes. This was the solitary warning of de Grandpre 
J., who, dissenting in Tomko, in effect criticized the majority reasoning as 
“tantam ount” to abolishing the jurisdiction of section 96 courts sooner or 
later”.32
Recent Non-Landlord-Tenant Decisions
Constitutional issues seem cyclical. The number of recent decisions of 
the Supreme Court of Canada pertaining to section 96 reflect a current 
awareness or popularity of the issue among the Bar. While many of the
yiSupra, footnote 24, S.C.R. 145; D.L.R. 275.
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controversies have no direct relationship to the particular legislation the 
putative subject of this comment, the judicial consideration of the disputed 
powers or jurisdiction in terms of institutional context (steps 2 and 3) may 
be of precedential or argumentative value. Accordingly, a cursory review 
of some of these authorities is in order.
In both Farah v. Attorney General o f Quebec33 and Crevier v. Attorney 
General of Quebec,34 the Supreme Court held invalid the exercise of appellate 
or supervisory jurisdiction where the provincially appointed appeal body 
functioned in isolation as such was not inexorably bound up in the 
primary administrative scheme. In Farah, a Transport Tribunal composed 
of Provincial Court judges was empowered to hear “in appeal, . . . any 
question of law, any decision of the [Transport] Commission which ter­
minates a m atter”.35 The Court had no difficulty in equating this statutory 
appellate jurisdiction with the inherent supervisory jurisdiction of Superior 
Courts at Confederation and in holding that the legislation in question 
merely involved a bare transfer of that very jurisdiction to a non-section 
96 body. As noted by Laskin C.J.C., “where an administrative appeal agency 
is constituted, divorced, as is the Transport Tribunal here, from involve­
ment in the exercise of original jurisdiction under the Transport Act and 
given a purely appellate authority . . . there is a meshing both of jurisdiction 
and power, giving it the form and authority of a section 96 Court”.36 In 
Crevier, a Professions Tribunal, composed of Provincial Court judges and 
established to hear appeals from 38 Disciplinary Committees governing 
Quebec professionals, was held to be similarly invalidly constituted. Laskin 
C.J.C., delivering the judgment of the Court, characterized the Tribunal 
as “not so much integrated into any scheme as it is sitting on top of the 
various schemes and with an authority detached from them . . .”37
Appellate jurisdiction confided in the Lieutenant-Governor in Council 
was, however, upheld in the more recent Supreme Court decision in Capital 
Regional District v. Concerned Citizens of British Columbia et a/.38 Pursuant to 
the provincial Pollution Control Act,39 appeals from decisions of the regu­
latory Board were alternatively available to the Supreme Court of British 
Columbia and the Lieutenant-Governor in Council, both of which were
” (1978), 21 N.R. 595.
,4(1981), 38 N.R. 541.
S5Transport Act, S.Q. 1972, c. 55, s.58(a).
56Supra , footnote 33, at 628.
57Supra . footnote 34, at 555. Note also Laskin C.J.C.'s discussion o f  privitive clauses with respect to  s.96: 
“ In my opinion, w here a provincial le g is la tu re  p u rpo rts  to insulate one o f its statutory tribunals from  any 
curial review o f its adjudicative functions, the  insulation encom passing jurisd ic tion , such provincial legis­
lation m ust be struck dow n as unconstitutional by reason ot having the effect o f constituting the tribunal 
a s.96 C o u rt.” Ibid., at 556.
**21 D ecem ber 1982 (unrepo rted ).
WS.B.C. 1967. c.34.
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empowered to “determine the matters involved and make any order 
that . . . appears just . . .”40 In delivering judgm ent for a unanimous Court, 
Laskin C.J.C. determined that the appellate function of the Lieutenant- 
Governor in Council was not isolated from, but rather “intertwined” in, 
the administrative scheme. The appellate function was only one of four — 
appointing power, regulation-making power, directory and supervisory 
power, and appellate power — that were reposed in the Lieutenant-Gov­
ernor and was one which, in the legislative history of the scheme, pre-dated 
appeals to the Supreme Court of British Columbia. That the directed ap­
pellate authority of both the Lieutenant-Governor in Council and the Court 
were legislatively identical did not necessarily require a uniform approach. 
Concluded Laskin C.J.C.:41 “There are no express directions in [the statute] 
that compel the Lieutenant-Governor in Council to yield to a purely judicial 
assessment of an appeal nor, in my opinion, does the word ju s t’ compel 
such an assessment. Policy remains open to a body which is a policy-making 
tribunal." Accordingly, the disputed function having been characterized as 
nonjudicial, section 96 was not violated.
Mississauga v. Regional M unicipality o f Peel42 illustrates the immersion 
of a putative section 96 judicial power within the institutional context of 
an administrative scheme such that its exercise by non-section 96 func­
tionaries is nonviolative of section 96. In yet another unanimous judgm ent 
pertaining to this issue delivered by Laskin C.J.C., the Ontario Municipal 
Board was held validly constituted to determine the vesting of assets and 
liabilities consequent upon a municipal restructuring. The challenge to the 
constitutionality of the Board’s power involved a segregation of the par­
ticular power from other functions or powers, a process Laskin C.J.C. 
characterized as an attempt “to turn the clock back and to restore Toronto 
v. York as the governing authority in this field of constitutional law”.43 It 
was further held that the requisite historical inquiry with respect to the 
subject power confirmed its exercise by non section 96 courts.44
In Massey-Ferguson Industries Ltd. et al v. Government o f Saskatchewan,45 
a unanimous Supreme Court applied the Ontario Residential Tenancies three- 
step test in upholding the validity of Saskatchewan’s Agricultural Implements 
A c t46 As part of a comprehensive scheme regulating distributors, dealers 
and consumers of farm equipment, the Legislature provided that the prov- 
incially appointed Board might award compensation or damages from a
40Ib id .. s. 12(5).
i i Supra. footnote 38. slip judgm en t p. 8.
«[1979] 2 S.C.R. 244; 26 N.R. 200.
" Ib id .,  S.C.R. 251; N.R. 206.
" Ib id .,  S.C.R 254; N.R 209.
«(1981), 39 N.R. 308 (S.C.C.).
4hR.S.S. 1978, c.A-10.
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fund, financed by levies imposed on distributors, where a farmer made 
application alleging “a loss, due to an unreasonable delay in the availability 
of a repair or who considers he has incurred a loss due to the vendor or 
the general provincial distributor, not fulfilling the conditions or warranties 
as set out in this Act or in a conditional sales con tract. . .”47 Though some­
what akin to judicial settlement of contractual disputes, Laskin C.J.C. dis­
tinguished the powers of the Board, in administering what he characterized 
as an insurance fund, on the basis that, in contradistinction to a section 96 
court: (a) compensation was not strictly determinable in accordance with 
legal considerations alone, since “claims on the Fund may result from loss 
or damage which is not attributable to any person’s fault in a legal sense”48; 
(b) the adjudication involved a claim against the Fund, not a Its inter partes 
“in the traditional sense” involving a distributor or dealer as compensatory 
defendant; and (c) the Board enjoyed an independent investigative role 
“unlike the neutral process of a Court”.49 In light of these distinguishing 
features, Laskin C.J.C., in analysis restricted to the institutional context, 
validated the power reposed in the Board. It is interesting to note that for 
the purposes of his analysis, Laskin C.J.C. was willing to assume, but with 
doubt, that the historical inquiry step in the Ontario Residential Tenancies 
test had been satisfied.
Finally in this series, mention must be made of Re Family Relations Act 
of British Columbia.™ Distinguishing this legislative scheme from others dis­
cussed was that the inpugned powers or jurisdiction were to be exercised 
by inferior court judges, thus obviating the necessity o f steps two and three 
in the Ontario Residential Tenancies test since the institutional context re­
mained curial and the powers and jurisdiction judicial. The sole determ i­
native issue was the historical inquiry of step one which, of course, is where 
the majority and minority parted on the issues of guardianship and custody 
and access.
Recent Landlord — Tenant Decisions
Provincial reorganization of the administration of traditional landlord- 
tenant relations has occasioned seven separate judicial considerations of 
section 96 in this context. The first and perhaps the most futile v%as the 
1978 Reference Re Proposed Legislation Concerning Leased Premises and Tenancy 
Agreements.sl Without the benefit of existing or draft legislation or even a 
basic proposal, the Alberta Court of Appeal was faced with the impossible
47¡ b i d s.6(D).
^Supra, footnote 45. at 323-24.
'Vbid., at 325.
»(1982), 40 N.R. 206 (S.C.C.).
»'(1978). 89 D.L.R. (3d) 460 (Alta. S.C., A.D.).
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task of determining the constitutionality of a provincially appointed tri­
bunal granting orders for possession to a landlord or orders for specific 
performance in respect of a tenancy agreement. In the absence of an 
institutional context and in light of a historical inquiry which confirmed 
section 96 “jurisdiction respecting land, possession, specific performance 
and the relationship of landlord and tenant”52, the Court had no alternative 
but to hold that the exercise of such powers or jurisdiction could not be 
conferred on provincial appointees. The decision, aside from the historical 
inquiry respecting the detached powers, is of more significance as an il­
lustration of poor use of the reference device than of precedential value.
That was not the situation, however, before the British Columbia Court 
of Appeal in Pepita v. Doukas.55 There, a tenant challenged the constitutional 
validity of an order terminating his tenancy made by a rentalsman on the 
statutory basis that “the conduct o f the tenant, or a person permitted in 
or on the residential property by the tenant, has unreasonably interferred 
with the enjoyment or safety o f occupants in the residential property so 
that it would be inequitable to those other occupants to allow the tenancy 
agreement to continue.”54 It is interesting to note an analytical divergence 
between the judgment of the B.C. Court, per Lambert J.A., in Pepita and 
that subsequently delivered by Dickson J. in Ontario Residential Tenancies. 
In contradistinction to Dickson J. who in step two of his enunciated test 
requires analyses of the subject function in its institutional context in order 
“to determine whether the function itself is different when viewed in that 
setting”,55 Lambert J.A. concluded that the subject function itself does not 
change but rather the question is whether the characterization of “the 
tribunal as a whole is different when the powers include the impugned 
function than it is when its powers do not include that function.”56 In this 
view, the emphasis should not be on the particular power or jurisdiction 
examined in an increasingly expansive process but rather the exercising 
body has its nature as an administrative tribunal altered because of the 
inclusion of the subject power or jurisdiction. “In short, clothing the tri­
bunal with the function makes a difference to the tribunal but not to the 
function”, stated Lambert J.A .57
In considering the detached power of issuing termination orders, Lam­
bert J.A. drew attention to a distinction between the deliberative and ex­
ecutive aspects of the function. If consideration focused exclusively on the 
final executive aspect of making the order, there would be no differentia-
MResidential Tenancy Act, S.B.C. 1977, c.61, s.22(a). 
SJSupra, footnote  31.
™lbid. at 471.
«(1979). 16 B.C.L.R. 120 (C.A.).
56Supra, footnote 53, at 127.
'‘Ib id .,  at 128.
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tion from the executive aspect in similar matters by section 96 courts. ’8 The 
crucial focus, however, was not the mere executive but the deliberative 
aspect. In proceeding to the determination of the issues, was the question 
to which the tribunal applied its “deliberative skill” different from that of 
a section 96 court?59 The answer to this question controlled, in the view of 
Lambert J.A., the preliminary step of historical inquiry with a view to 
conformity or analogy to section 96 powers or jurisdiction. However, Lam­
bert J.A. did not resolve the “difficult and obscure” issue of historical 
analysis, opting instead to concentrate on the institutional context as the 
decisive factor.60
Institutionally, Lambert J.A. distinguished the functioning of a rent­
alsman under the B.C. Residential Tenancy Act from a section 96 court on 
the following basis:61 (a) the statutory ability of the rentalsman to render 
decisions, independently of legal precedent, according to the merits of the 
case or, as stated by Lambert J.A ., by “common sense and a sense of fairness, 
and when those fail to lead to a solution he is to be guided not by law but 
by his sense of the social policy of the legislation”62; (b) the lack of enforce­
ment power in the rentalsman; (c) that a termination proceeding might be 
initiated not only by the direct parties to the landlord-tenant relationship 
but also another tenant or on the rentalsman's own initiative (subsection 
47(2)); (d) the foundation for a termination order lay not strictly within 
the confines of the consensual landlord-tenant agreement but the statutory 
rights and obligations enunciated in the particular legislative provision; and 
(e) the mediatory role of the rentalsman as opposed to the strictly adju­
dicative court function. Lambert J.A. also held that the subject power was 
not divorced or isolated from the general administrative (quasi-judicial) 
functions of the rentalsman but was “closely intertwined". In his words, 
“the [termination order} function is not readily severable from that frame­
work to leave a complete and comprehensive legislative scheme.”6’ Utilizing 
Lambert J.A .’s own test, the deliberative aspect involved in the exercise of 
the rentalsman’s termination order power was not conformable or analo­
gous to that of a section 96 court in either its detached but particularly its 
institutional form.
Recognizing the significance attached in both John East and Tomko to 
a distinct social policy underpinning the legislation (in those cases peaceful 
collective labour relations), Lambert J.A. sought to further support his 
conclusions by defining the social policy of the Residential Tenancy Act. How­
ever, in setting that policy as “security of tenure and quiet enjoyment by
* !b id ., at 131. 
'•Vbtd.
*>lbtd., at 131-32. 
6llb td ., at 136-37.
6ilb td ., at 136.
Mlbid ., at 137.
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tennants”64 with respect to the mechanism of the rentalsman, he did not 
distinguish the traditional policy of landlord-tenant relations enforced by 
courts beyond noting the substitution of government control for freedom 
of contract. This failure to particularize a unique social policy behind mod­
ernization of landlord-tenant relations, especially the lack of the collective 
versus private rights distinction, has continued to trouble courts.
Specifically at issue in the Ontario Residential Tenancies Reference65 was 
the constitutional validity of the authority and power of the provincially 
appointed Residential Tenancies Commission to make eviction and com­
pliance orders as provided in the Residential Tenancies Act, 1979.'*  Prior to 
a thoughtful review of precedent and the enunciation of his three step 
test,67 Dickson J., in delivering the judgm ent of the Supreme Court, set 
forth the broad legislative history of the Ontario scheme and in the course 
of these preliminary matters made two significant observations: (a) that 
“resolution of disputes between landlords and tenants has long been a 
central preoccupation of the common law courts”68 and (b) that the “most 
significant role” of the Commission was dispute resolution triggered “upon 
application” of either landlord or tenant, or a third party “in one of two 
circumstances”.69
Step one, the historical inquiry, was virtually conceded against the 
preliminary validity o f the legislation by the admission of the Ontario At­
torney-General that the eviction and compliance order powers were not 
only analogous to ejectment and injunctive powers of section 96 courts “but 
are the same powers”.70 Dickson J., in declaring that such powers were 
those of a section 96 court, stated that the essential features o f the orders 
were the same in 1967 as under the subject legislation — “[i]n an ejectment 
in 1867 a landlord was . . . seeking the removal of a tenant from his 
land . . . [and] a landlord seeking an injunction against a tenant in pre- 
Confederation times is in substantially the same position as a modern lan­
dlord seeking compliance under the Act”.71
Step two, the analysis o f the impugned powers as exercised in the 
institutional context of the Commission, from the perspective of deter­
mining whether the powers were still judicial’ (i.e., still section 96 powers),
•"Ibid.. at 134
ft'’Supra , footnote  29.
'■"SO. 1979. c.78.
"'Supra , footnote 31.
Supra , footnote  29, at 161. 
Mll>id. ai 169; repeated , 185. 
'"Ibid. at 177.
T'lbid.. at 178.
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was also determined against the validity of the legislation. Dickson J. noted 
that even in the context of a third party complaint to the Commission, a 
lis inter partes existed involving the landlord and the tenant; the function 
of the Commission being “to determine the respective rights and obligations 
of the parties according to the terms of the legislation.”72 In contradistinc­
tion to the labour relations cases where the subject dispute was not defined 
in terms of a private lis between employer-employee but a collective interest 
in an allegedly unfair labour practice, landlord-tenant disputes involve no 
real collective interest in the particular private lis. Additionally, it had been 
argued that the Commission would not necessarily be acting judicially since 
it was statutorily directed to decide “upon the real merits and justice of the 
case.”73 It is to be noted that in Pepita, the B.C. legislation similarly directed 
the rentalsman but added the qualification that the rentalsman was not 
bound by legal precedent. In dismissing this argument, Dickson J. noted 
that the Commission, in hearing disputes, did so “in accordance with rules 
of law, and by the authority of the law" in a forum controlled bv the 
procedural safeguards of the Statutory Powers Procedure Act, 1 9 7 / 7‘ such as 
the right to counsel, to call, examine and cross-examine witnesses, and to 
written reasons for decision.75 Accordingly, Dickson J. concluded that the 
exercise of the powers in their institutional context remained ‘judicial’.
Step three, the examination of the broader f unctioning of the tribunal 
as a whole in order to determine whether the “adjudicative function is a 
sole or central function . . .  so that the tribunal can be said to be operating 
like a section 96 court”76 was also held against the validity of the legislation. 
Notwithstanding the admitted educative and mediative functions of the 
Commission, Dickson J. reiterated his earlier conclusions that “the central 
function of the Commission is that of resolving disputes, in the final resort 
by a judicial form of hearing.”77 The mediative function of the Commission 
was not significant to the issue, per Dickson J., because it depended upon 
the receptivity of the parties involved without which a judicial hearing was 
required. No doubt because of the judicial nature of any required hearing, 
the Commission’s statutory investigative function™ was not referred to by 
the Court.
Violative of all three steps in the enunicated test, the exercise of eviction 
and compliance order powers by the Ontario Residential Tenancies Com­
Tilb id .. at 183.
75S upra , footnote 66, s.93(l).
7«S.O. 1971, c. 47.
73S upra , footnote  29, at 184.
™lbtd., at 176.
77Ibid.. at 185.
78S upra , footnote 66, s. 108: “T h e  Com m ission m ay, before o r d u rin g  a hearing , (a) conduct any inquiry
o r inspection it considers necessary; and  (b) question  any person, bv telephone o r otherwise concerning
the d ispu te ."
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mission was accordingly held unconstitutional as an infringement of section
96.79
In Nova Scotia, the law-applying functions conferred upon a provin- 
cially appointed Board by a legislative scheme of landlord-tenant law re­
form have similarly been held afoul of section 96. In Easton v. Residential 
Tenancies B oard,80 a decision of the Trial Division which preceded the Su­
preme Court of Canada judgm ent in Ontario Residential Tenancies, Sullivan 
J. relied heavily upon the Court o f Appeal decision in the latter case81 in 
holding invalid the provincial Board’s mediative function8'-' and its authority 
to issue term ination83 and possessory orders.84 For the reasons stated by 
the Ontario Court of Appeal and subsequently reiterated by the Supreme 
Court, Sullivan J. held that the situation was not a Tomko one of new 
collective rights regulated by an administrative body unlike a section 97 
court, but rather that of traditional private rights merely being adjudicated 
in a new setting not dissimilar in function from a section 96 court. In the 
curial institutional context of the Board, the mediative function, coupled 
as it was with the power to “give advice and direction”,85 was held violative 
of section 96 because the power of direction was interpreted as a power of 
decision or “authoritative instruction” a curial adjudicative f unction. T his 
power, as well as the termination and possessory order powers, were held 
to be not merely incidental or subsidiary to other administrative functions 
of the Board but its core elements.
In Burke v. Arab,m the Nova Scotia Appeal Division relied unduly on 
the Supreme Court of Canada reasoning in Ontario Residential Tenancies in 
virtually relieving the provincial Board o f any viable f unctions. This is all 
the more remarkable since, as with Easton, the constitutional issue arose in 
the context of a lis inter partes — an appeal by a tenant from a lower court 
decision allowing a claim by a landlord for the excess over the damages 
limit awarded by the Board. Instead of limiting itself to the particular 
statutory power exercised by the Board in the matter, the Court held invalid
7''T he provisions of the  O n ta rio  Residential Tenancies Act in issue never having been prcx laimed, no curative 
m easures have vet been enacted by the O n tario  Legislature.
"“(1980), 41 N.S.R (2d) 44.
1,1Reference Re Residential Tenancies Act (1980), 26. O  R. (2d) 609 (Ci.A.).
Residential Tenancies Act, S.N.S. 1970, c.13, s. 1 l(3)(b).
■ Residential Tenancies Act. S.N.S. 1970. c.13, as a m ended  by S.N.S. 1973, i .  70, s.2 adding  s.I l(3)(g).
"'Ibid., s. 11 (3)(h). T h e  A ttorney-G eneral conceded tha t the pow er to o rd e r vac ant possession was a historical 
s.96 power and  re fe rred  to R.S.N.S. 1864, c.140, s.2; R.S.N.S. 1884, 1 . 126, s.I.
85Supra , foo tno te  82.
" ’( 1981 ), 49 N.S.R (2d) I8 l. Appeal to  the  S uprem e C ourt o f  C anada dism issed 3 1 (anuary  1983, Bulletin 
of Proceedings T ak en  in the S uprem e C ourt of C anada. 4 February 1983.
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the whole range of powers conferred upon the Board87 except general 
investigative and educative functions and the very mediative function held 
invalid in Easton, which decision was not referred to by the Court. Among 
the powers held unconstitutional are several clearly or arguably non-section 
96 functions or powers such as the investigative power pertaining to vio­
lations of the Act itself. Feeling itself bound by the Ontario Residential Ten­
ancies decision in the matter before it, the Court held that the Nova Scotia 
legislation was not dissimilar from that considered in the Ontario case and 
that the essential nature or primary role of the Board was to resolve disputes 
in a judicial manner.88
A further matter in the scheme of landlord-tenant reform — rent 
review or control — has also been considered in light of section 96. Rent 
review differs from other reform of basic landlord-tenant relations because 
of its more easily discernible social policy superseding private contractual 
rights. Based on an assumption that renters comprise a lower economic 
segment of society and that there is an inequality of bargaining power in 
times of inflationary accommodation costs, the Legislature may see fit to 
subsume private arrangements and rights between landlords and tenants 
by a general policy of restraint in favour of tenants as a collectivity. If that 
is the true rationale, the tool o f rent review is suspect since obviously direct 
subsidization of needy tenants would more particularly accomplish the goal. 
There is, however, a relationship between the recognizable social policy 
and the enforcement mechanism.
87lt is in the  (unction o f  the  residential tenancies board and it shall have power.
(a) to  investigate and  review m atters  affecting landlords and  tenants and provide and  dessim inate 
info rm ation  concerning ren tal practices, rights and  rem edies:
(b) to  m ediate disputes betw een landlords and  tenants and give advice and  direction to  landlords 
and  tenants in disputes;
(c) to  investigate allegations o f  violations o f  the  provisions o f this Act and the  statutory conditions 
provided by Section 6;
(d) to  investigate and  review the ren t charged  lo r residential prem ises and  de term ine w hether the 
ren t to be approved o r varied;
(e) to direct the tenan t to  pav the  ren t in trust o r accept rent payable bv a tenant and hold the same 
in trust pend ing  perfo rm ance  bv a landlord  of any act the  landlord  is required  b\ law to pet form :
(f) to  require  the re tu rn  o f  a security deposit o r m oney o r o th e r value o r a portion thereof field b\ 
o r fo r a landlord o r  tenant;
(g) to provide for the te rm ina tion  o f  the tenancy between the landlord  and  the tenan t w here the 
residential prem ises a re  being physically dam aged b \ the tenant o r the tenan t is conducting  himself 
in such a m anner as to unduly  in te rfere  with the possession o r occupancy of o ther tenants:
(h) to  direct that the land lo rd  be put into possession o f  the  residential premise’s where the tenan t is 
in a rrea rs  o f ren t for m ore than  fourteen  days for weekly tenancies and m ore than  forty-five days 
for m onthly o r yearly tenanc ies;
(i) requ ire  the paym ent o f  m oney by the landlord  o r the tenant, said paym ent not to exceed five 
h u n d re d  dollars.
mSupra, footnote 86, at 198. T h e  constitu tional position o f the  a lternative law-applying functionaries in­
cluded in the  legislative schem e, the  provincial m agistrates per s. 10, though  not directly discussed, was 
alluded to by the C ourt. Since th e re  can be no doubt o f  the curial na tu re  of these functionaries and  that 
the injunctive, term ination  and  possessory o rd e r powers con fe rred  upon  them  b\ the Act are historically 
s.96 powers, there  can be no doub t o f  th e  invalidity o f  their exercise by the provincially appo in ted  
m agistrates.
Curative legislation, S.N.S. 1982, c.54, am ends the  Residential Tenancies Art bv conferring  overall jurisdiction 
on the  C ounty  C ourt with the B oard re legated  to an investigative function reporting  to the C ourt.
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In Cohen v. Dhillon ,89 the B.C. County Court held valid a provincial 
legislative scheme of rent review where the Commission acted in an ad­
ministrative non-section 96 m anner by initiating the review proceedings 
itself and conducting its own investigation. In so doing, the Commission 
acted in a non-curial m anner in what the County Court characterized as 
“administering a legislative scheme of rent control, apart entirely from the 
contract between those parties.”90 A similar scheme was upheld by the Nova 
Scotia Supreme Court, Appeal Division in Fort Massey Realties Ltd. v. Rent 
Review Commission91 though in a most unsatisfactory cursory manner. The 
Court, after extensive references to Cohen v. Dhillon, seemingly drew on 
some incontestable support by stating in abstractu that “boards or commis­
sion have always been deemed essential to such controls.”92 The Court 
further quoted Dickson J. in the Ontario Residential Tenancies References as 
follows:93 “In 1975 the Legislature of Ontario introduced The Residential 
Premises Rent Review Act, 1975 (2nd Sess.) c.12, to establish rent control. 
The ability of the province to administer a rent review system, of course, 
in no way encroached on the traditional jurisdiction of the section 96 courts 
to order termination, eviction and compliance.” The relevance of this quo­
tation to the determination of the issue is at least nebulous since in no way 
can Dickson J. be thought to have impliedly sanctioned rent control as 
inherently non-violative of section 96. Completing a rather unsatisfactory 
analysis, the Court, without expressly utilizing the Ontario Residential Ten­
ancies test, held that it had not been violated.
Summary
The preceding review of recent section 96 authorities illustrates many 
significant points pertaining to the second and third steps in the Ontario 
Residential Tenancies test which may be material to our analysis of the con­
stitutional validity of the New Brunswick legislation. First, it is important 
to recognize the controlling context of the particular legislative scheme in 
issue before the Court. Constitutional law provides nothing more than 
“rules of the game” the application of which vary with the context. The 
“rules” merely keep the players honest; proper legislative draf ting can avoid 
a violation of the rules. Mere application by rote of judicial precedent in 
the absence of caref ul analysis of the particular legislative context in issue, 
as unfortunately seems to be illustrated by the Nova Scotia Appeal Division 
decisions in Burke v. Arab and Fort Massey Realties Ltd. v. Rent Review Com­
mission, may fail to discern the crucial subtleties upon which precedents are 
distinguished.
8W( 1979), 13 B.C.L.R. 334 (Co. Ct.).
*>lbid.. at 345.
»'(1982), 50 N.S.R. (2d) 451.
92Ibid., at 460.
^Ibid.: quoting, supra, footnote 28, at 167.
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Second, the importance of a lis inter partes. Analyzed on the basis of a 
distinction between private rights and policy-based collective rights, the 
absence of a lis in the traditional sense was of significance in John East Iron 
Works and Tomko pertaining to labour relations and in Massey-Fergus on con­
cerning a farm implement insurance fund. However, in Ontario Residential 
Tenancies the Supreme Court affirmed the existence of a lis in the traditional 
sense in landlord-tenant proceedings even when the adjudicative process 
was initiated by a third party. The issues in dispute remain the respective 
rights and obligations of the landlords and tenants concerned, not super­
imposed collective rights or obligations.
Third, an independent investigative function may qualitatively differ­
entiate the suspect provincially appointed functionary from a section 96 
court, as in Tomko and Massey-Ferguson. Unlike the passivity of a court, the 
Board or Commission may itself actively gather information upon which 
to determine the issues before it.
Fourth, a statutory direction to determine a matter “on the real merits" 
or “as appears just” will not allow a provincially appointed functionary to 
render a decision apart from the strict legal rights of the parties, per Ontario 
Residential Tenancies. However, a further qualification dispensing with the 
strict application of legal precedent will allow a policy-oriented, non-judicial 
decision as in Pepita v. Doukas, or by the inherent policy bias of the tribunal 
as in Concerned Citizens o f B.C.
Fifth, a section 96 power or function may be exercised by a provincially 
appointed functionary where the power or function is not divorced from 
but intertwined in a broader administrative scheme and is not its sole or 
central function, per Farah, Crevier, Pepita v. Doukas and Ontario Residential 
Tenancies.
Sixth, an adjudicative process involving a judicial form of hearing is 
one of the hallmarks in determining whether, in its context, a power or 
function is exercised judicially.
The New Brunswick Legislation
Breach of landlord-tenant relations by either party, either at common 
law or statute, evokes a limited array of remedies. If the relationship is to 
be terminated, the parties are to be placed in the status quo ante — the 
tenant is to surrender and the landlord to regain immediate possession. If 
the relationship is to continue, the party in breach must be made to fulfill 
his obligations in the future and perhaps compensate for past omissions. 
Though the nomenclature changes the essence remains the same, as noted 
by Dickson, J. in Ontario Residential Tenancies,94 Thus the orders for pos-
94Supra. footnote 71.
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session considered in Ref. Re Proposed Legislation and Easton, the eviction 
orders in Ontario Residential Tenancies, and the termination orders in Pepita 
v. Doukas and Easton, all amount in general to a return of the landlord to 
possession of the leased premises. The courts have had no difficulty in 
characterizing such powers as analogous or conformable to those histori­
cally exercised by section 96 courts. The second remedy, respecting the 
present and future fulfillment of obligations, w hether expressed as an order 
for specific performance as in the Ref. R e Proposed Legislation, or as a com­
pliance order in Ontario Residential Tenancies, has similarly been held a 
historically section 96 power or function.
Under New Brunswick’s Residential Tenancies Act":\  the arsenal of pow­
ers conferred upon the provincially appointed rentalsman are the first 
mentioned tenancy-termination powers designated as eviction orders and 
notices to quit and the latter continuing-tenancy power of compliance o r­
ders. A historical inquiry particularized to the pre-Confederation court 
structure in New Brunswick is not essential since the section 96 court con­
cept is not individu lized for each province but is a broader common con­
cept.96 Therefore, on the basis of the authorities discussed it can be accepted, 
or at least assumed, that the first step in the Ontario Residential Tenancies 
test has been satisfied: the powers or jurisdiction of the rentalsman are 
broadly conformable to those historically exercised by a section 96 court.
Step two involves consideration of the exercise of these powers, in the 
context of the institutional setting structured by the legislative scheme, in 
order to determine if they are still characterizable as “judicial”.
The compliance order power of the rentalsman is set out in sections 
5 and 6 of the Act. By section 5, where a landlord alleges a failure on the 
part of a tenant to fulfill his obligations under the Act or the tenancy 
agreement, the landlord may so advise the rentalsman after notice to and 
failing remedial action by the tenant. Subsection 5(3) states that the rent­
alsman “(a) may conduct an investigation; (b) may inspect the premises; 
and (c) after conducting an investigation or inspecting the premises or 
both, may require the tenant to fu lfill his obligations" (emphasis added). Sub 
section 6(3) is an equivalent provision with respect to a complaint by a 
tenant that a landlord has not fulfilled his obligations.
Where a tenant fails to heed a compliance order, the rentalsman is 
empowered by subsection 5(4), to “serve on the tenant a notice to quit 
terminating the tenancy and requiring the tenant to vacate the prem ­
ises . . .” However, failure by a landlord to obey a compliance order will 
result, by subsection 6(4), in the rentalsman himself performing the obli­
gation. Secondly, a notice to quit may also be issued where, pursuant to 
subsection 6(8), a rentalsman determines that it is reasonable to do so “on
%But see, o f Landlord and T m a n t, and Replevin, R.S.N.B. 1854, c. 126.
9iS.N.B. 1975, c.R-10.2.
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the basis of destruction of the premises or other cause." Thirdly, where, 
following notice by the landlord and an investigation by the rentalsman 
within five days of the notice, a tenant has been found not to have paid 
his rent, the rentalsman may issue a notice to quit.
A notice to quit under the Act is not an executable order; failure by a 
tenant to vacate the premises does not, by itself, invoke any penalty. Re­
medial action lies in a further application by a landlord to the rentalsman 
for an eviction order which may be issued, pursuant to section 21, where 
a notice to quit has not been complied with by a tenant or where a tenant 
has not vacated following receipt of a notice to terminate (section 24). In 
the form er instance, the rentalsman may issue the eviction order without 
an investigation, though one is required in the latter. An eviction order is 
executable by the Sheriff (subsection 21(4)).
In their institutional setting, the powers of the rentalsman cannot be 
construed as “judicial” for the purposes of section 96 nor as still conform­
able to those of a section 96 court. Admittedly, there remains in issue a 
dispute over private rights, a lis inter partes, between landlord and tenant. 
But the functioning of a rentalsman does not approach that of a curial 
body. In contradistinction to Ontario Residential Tenancies, there is no re­
quirem ent and indeed no provision for a formalized hearing before a 
rentalsman for the adjudication of rights. Rather, the rentalsman has a 
separate investigative role prior to the issuing of a compliance order, notice 
to quit or eviction order. It is consequent to the investigation that an order 
may issue and is to be noted that the generally factual inquiry may be, of 
necessity, lacking in formal procedures, as in section 19(2) where the in­
vestigation has a five day time frame.
However, this does not mean that a landlord or tenant can be denied 
the protection afforded by the rule audi alteram partem  or the concepts of 
natural justice and procedural fairness. The right of the parties to be 
“heard” does not necessarily evoke all the procedural safeguards of a for­
malized curial form of hearing. The standard of procedural fairness re­
quired is a variable one and may amount to no more than being “given 
access to and the opportunity to refute . . . any information gathered . . .  in 
the cause of [the] investigation which was prejudicial.”97 For administrative 
law purposes, characterization of a function as “judicial” evokes the rule 
of natural justice. The undoubted adjudicative function of the rentalsman 
would be so characterized. However, for constitutional law purposes, such 
characterization does not necessarily follow. The indicia of a “judicial func­
tion”, offered by Dickson J. in Ontario Residential Tenancies9N for the purpose
9:Re D owning and  Graydon (1978), 92 D.L.R. (3d) 355, 373 (O nt. C.A.) (Blair J.A .); see also. Re Nicholson, 
(1979] S.C.R. 111; J . Evans el al. Adm inistrative Law: Cases, Text id  Materials (T oron to : E m ond-M ontgom erv 
Ltd., 1980), ch. 1,2. T h is  w ould also ap p ea r to satisfy Canadian (Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s. 7: “Everyone 
has the  righ t to life, liberty and  security o f  the  person and  the right not to be deprived  thereo l except in 
accordance with the  principles o f  na tu ra l justice.”
98Supra, footnote 31.
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of step two in the test of a violation of section 96, are admittedly applicable 
to the adjudicative function of the rentalsman. It must be remembered, 
however, that that function is not an isolated one but is coupled with a 
nonjudicial investigative function with less than judicial form of procedures. 
As noted earlier with respect to Tomko and Massey-Ferguson, an investigative 
function may qualitatively differentiate a law-applying body from a section 
96 court.
Further, a notice to quit dif fers f undamentally from a section 96 court 
order in that it is not itself an enforceable order but merely, as its name 
suggests, a notice. It is but a preliminary step which may culminate in an 
enforceable order. In Tomko, that the Labour Relations Board could not 
enforce its cease and desist order was considered to be of significance by 
the Supreme Court; a fortiori with respect to the weaker notice to quit. With 
respect to a compliance order, that the rentalsman may himself fulfill the 
landlord’s obligations clearly distinguishes the functioning of the rentals­
man from a section 96 court.
The provision which causes the most concern from a constitutional 
perspective is subsection 6(8) which allows a rentalsman to issue a notice 
to quit “on the basis of destruction of the premises or other cause”. Detached 
from the legislative scheme, it calls for a “determ ination” by the rentalsman; 
there is no investigative function to shelter the power. However, it would 
be in error to separate this function from its broad institutional context — 
the rentalsman’s functions as a whole.
The second step in the Ontario Residential Tenancies test must be de­
termined in the negative. The powers or functions of the rentalsman under 
the New Brunswick Residential Tenancies Act are not “judicial”; are dif ferent 
from a section 96 court when viewed in their institutional setting, and in 
the terms of the third step in the test, the rentalsman cannot be said to be 
operating “like a section 96 court”. The other major tasks of the rentalsman 
are clearly non-judicial, for example, the administration of the security 
deposit fund (section 8) and the educative and mediative functions (sub­
section 26(2)(a)(b)(c)).
Appeals to the Court of Queen’s Bench from a decision or order of a 
rentalsman may be made on the bases of lack of jurisdiction or error of 
law (per subsection 27(1)). Nowhere in the legislation is there conferred 
upon the rentalsman authority to make decisions or orders apart from legal 
precedent as in Pepita v. Doukas. In Ontario Residential Tenancies, the Ontario 
Court of Appeal placed particular emphasis on the “question of law” ground 
of appeal from decisions of the Residential Tenancies Commission in dem ­
onstrating that the Commission was to make a strictly legal decision." Sim­
ilarly the argum ent may be made vis a vis New Brunswick’s rentalsman. 
However, it must be borne in mind that the Ontario Commission was to
"i'u/wa, footnote 81, at 636.
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adjudicate disputes in the forum of a judicial form of hearing; the rent- 
alsman does not. The deciding factor remains that the powers exercised 
by the rentalsman in their institutional setting are not conformable or 
analogous to the functioning of a section 96 court.
Conclusion
While no a priori analysis, especially constitutional analysis, can be en­
tirely free from doubt, it is submitted that New Brunswick’s Residential 
Tenancies Act does not violate the Constitution Act, 1967  section 96 with respect 
to the powers and jurisdiction of the rentalsman. Application of the relevant 
test in the context of judicial precedent would indicate that the investigative 
function of the rentalsman qualitatively differentiates the rentalsman from 
a section 96 court.
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